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Abstract
Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) connects millions of devices
of different cyber-physical systems (CPSs) providing the CPSs additional
(implicit) redundancy during runtime. However, the increasing level of
dynamicity, heterogeneity, and complexity adds to the system’s vulner-
ability, and challenges its ability to react to faults. Self-healing is an
increasingly popular approach for ensuring resilience, that is, a proper
monitoring and recovery, in CPSs. This work encodes and searches an
adaptive knowledge base in Prolog/ProbLog that models relations among
system variables given that certain implicit redundancy exists in the sys-
tem. We exploit the redundancy represented in our knowledge base to
generate adaptive runtime monitors which compares related signals by
considering uncertainties in space and time. This enables the comparison
of uncertain, asynchronous, multi-rate and delayed measurements. The
monitor is used to trigger the recovery process of a self-healing mecha-
nism. We demonstrate our approach by deploying it in a real-world CPS
prototype of a rover whose sensors are susceptible to failure.
1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are desired to be resilient (i.e., dependable and
secure) against different kinds of faults throughout its lifecycle. Failure scenarios
like communication crashes and dead batteries (fail-silent, fail-stop) are easy to
handle (watchdog/timeout). However, sensor data may be erroneous due to
noise (e.g., communication line, aging), environmental influences (e.g., dirtying,
weather) or a security breach. To detect a sensor failure one has to define a valid
signature [1–4] or specification [5,6] or create particular failure models [7,8] for
each possible hazard (c.f., aging, dirtying and a security breach). A simple
method for detecting a faulty sensor value in different failure scenarios is to
check against related information sources, i.e., exploit redundancy. Explicit
redundancy, that is replicating the sensor [9, 10] is costly.
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A designed system might not incorporate (implicit) redundancy straight-
away (if so, the system would use information fusion to exploit the redundancy).
However, when assembling (sub-)systems of different suppliers redundancy of-
ten becomes available. This is typically the case for distributed systems like the
Internet of Things (IoT) or a Cyber-Physical System (CPS). For instance, the
drivetrain of an electric vehicle is equipped with several sensors at the battery,
motor, transmission, shaft, differential, or wheels level. The physical entities
(CPS variables) observed in these subsystems, e.g., power consumption, revolu-
tion, speed or torque, are all related to the velocity of the vehicle, thus providing
implicit information redundancy [11,12].
We exploit such implicit redundancy by encoding it in a knowledge base [11,
13] created by domain experts or learned during runtime. Our previous work [14]
shows how to use the redundancy to substitute failed observation components.
We refer to it as Self-Healing by Structural Adaptation (SHSA). The SHSA
service acts independently of the application on the communication network of
the system. However, it needs a monitor to trigger the recovery from failures.
This work exploits the SHSA knowledge base to monitor related informa-
tion. Similar solutions [15–17] perform the comparison synchronously, that is,
all measurements are assumed to have the same timestamp (and therefore can
be safely compared against each other). However, typically the runtime monitor
has to cope with asynchronous, multi-rate and delayed measurements. More-
over, the timestamp of a measurement might not express the time when the
CPS variable actually adopted this value (time-delay system). Typical runtime
monitors are statically configured and therefore cannot cope with changes of a
dynamic and evolving system (e.g., availability of signals, message structure of
the observations).
We therefore propose an observation model based on interval arithmetic
considering uncertainties in space and time and an adaptive method to compare
such signals. In particular, our novel contributions are as follows:
• A short, adaptive and extensible implementation of the knowledge base in
Prolog/ProbLog.
• A simple model for observations of a signal that is prone to uncertainties
in space and time.
• The generation of adaptive runtime monitors for signals which compare
uncertain, asynchronous, multi-rate and/or delayed observations.
• Demonstration of our method on a real-world application – an implemen-
tation on a rover prototype that performs collision avoidance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
related work. Section 3 introduces the running example of our mobile robot and
defines the knowledge base. Section 4 encodes the knowledge base in Prolog.
Section 5 describes the signal model and shows how a monitor is generated
for comparing itoms. Section 6 demonstrates and tests the fault detection of
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the generated monitor. Section 7 concludes by summarizing our results and
outlining the future work.
2 Related Work
In [11], Ho¨ftberger introduced an ontology (a knowledge base) defining physical
relations or semantic equivalences between variables (e.g., laws of physics) to
substitute failed observation services. We applied this technique in [14] and we
extended the knowledge base with properties and utility theory in [13]. However,
this knowledge base has been only exploited for failure recovery, but not yet for
fault detection.
Literature on fault detection is spread to the area of runtime verification [5,6],
anomaly detection [1], intrusion detection [2–4], fault-tolerance [9, 18–20] and
self-healing [21,22]. Approaches to detect faults typically use a specification or
signature, an anomaly model or redundancy as a reference to judge the behavior
of an entity.
A popular approach to perform fault detection in safety critical systems is
to exploit redundancy of components. Examples include lockstep [10] and triple
modular redundancy (TMR) [9] that explicitly replicate software or hardware
components to detect faults. In the best case the replicas are diverse, i.e., they
have been separately designed but share the same functionality and interface,
to avoid joint or concurrent failures. Replication is generally expensive because
it requires additional time and resources both at design time and runtime.
The security framework described in [23] performs anomaly detection on
input signals of a component in a distributed network by comparing the input
against trusted local signals (if available). The local signals may be provided
by sensors which are directly sampled by the component and not advertised in
the vulnerable communication network (cf. IoT) of the system.
The proposed method in [15] votes over signals sent through transfer func-
tions (cf. relations) of known or unknown relationships of signals. The difference
between the signals raises an alert when it exceeds a threshold. Similarly, we
use transfer functions (here: relations) to bring signals into a common domain
before comparison.
The author of [16] uses ensemble modeling to represent the redundancy of
data streams. First a dependency graph between data streams of nodes is cre-
ated (via cross-correlation). An ensemble of estimators of the learned models is
defined given a threshold on the cross-correlation. The estimators can be cre-
ated from different types of models (e.g., linear functions or neural networks) to
relate the data streams to each other (temporal and functional relationships in
the physical layer). The output of the estimators are combined in a weighted-
averaging fashion (cf. confidence-weighted averaging [24]). Another threshold
for the estimator output defines whether an anomaly has occurred or not. How-
ever, the ensemble is statically defined during design time. The estimators have
to be aggregated and weighted in a proper way. Similarly, the threshold is cru-
cial to avoid false positives. Although time delays are not discussed, appropriate
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estimators can be set up to consider (at least constant) time delays.
The authors of [25] propose instead a Bayesian network (BN) with past
and future values of sensor readings and redundant ones (spatial and temporal
redundancy) to estimate the true state of a variable. A sensor is classified faulty,
when its measurement exceeds a threshold given the estimated state. Similarly,
fault injection is used to evaluate the monitoring technique. The proposed BN
can be compared to a state estimator fusing redundant sensors.
References
Redundancy Dynamic
Systems
Uncertain Signals
Explicit Implicit Space Time
[9, 10] X
[23] X X
[15] X
[25] X X
[16] X X X
This work X X X X X
Table 1: Comparison of state-of-the-art fault detection using redundancy.
All related work listed in Table 1 considers constant variance of the signals,
i.e., the threshold for mismatch is set a priori. By using intervals to express
observations we can handle time-varying errors. Most of the related work as-
sumes the signals to compare to be sampled at the same point in time, i.e.,
are truly comparable. A dynamic BN like proposed by [25] could relate asyn-
chronous observations to each other by forward estimation given the timestamp
of the observation. However, neither of the listed work discussed this issue. Our
knowledge base resembles a Bayesian network (in particular the sensor model
of a BN), similar to [16,25], but with deterministic nodes (relations or transfer
functions) that can be re-used, merged and adapted when components are added
or removed from a dynamic system. However, for our needs the knowledge base
expresses a set of rules (cf. relations) on how to compare signals or to substitute
a failed signal.
3 Background
In this section we recap our knowledge base of redundancy and showcase it on
a real-world prototype [13].
3.1 Running Example
The running example is a mobile robot (Pioneer 3-AT) that avoids collisions.
Our rover under test (Fig. 1) is equipped with a Jetson TK1 and a Rasp-
berry Pi 3 running the Robot Operating System (ROS) [26] and controlled via
WiFi using a notebook. A ROS application can be distributed into several
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Figure 1: Mobile robot equipped with its sensors and processing units.
processes, so-called nodes which may run on different machines. Nodes com-
municate via a message-based interface over TCP/IP. In particular, ROS nodes
subscribe and publish to ROS topics (cf. named channels). ROS can start new
nodes and reconfigure the communication flow of existing nodes during runtime
and it is therefore suitable for SHSA [14].
3.2 System Model
As our focus is on self-healing in the software cyber-part of a CPS Z (cf. dy-
namic reconfiguration of an FPGA), we assume that each physical component
comprises at least one software component z (e.g., the driver of the LIDAR)
and henceforth, consider the software components only.
A system Z can be characterized by properties, referred to as system fea-
tures, or simply as variables V (e.g., position of a vehicle, point cloud or distance
measurements acquired by a LIDAR). In SHSA we focus on observations of CPS
variables and refer to the actual data as value. A signal v(t) or short v represents
the values of a variable v over time (t ∈ R) provided by a certain component
(e.g., a sensor).
The value of a system variable – an observation – is communicated between
components typically via message-based interfaces. We denote such transmitted
data representing the value of a variable v, as information atom [27], short itom.
In general, an itom is a tuple including data and an explanation of this data.
An SHSA itom v(ts) = (v, ts) is a sample or a snapshot of a variable at a
certain point in time ts. It provides the following explanation of the data:
i) the associated variable or entity, and ii) the timestamp of the acquisition or
generation of the value. Each itom is identified by its signal’s name v and its
timestamp. A variable can be provided by different components simultaneously
(e.g., p redundant sensors).
Each software component z executes a program that uses input signals and
provides output signals.
The CPS implements some functionality, a desired service (e.g., tracking).
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Figure 2: Relevant application components and signals of the mobile robot.
The subset of components implementing the CPS’ objectives are called con-
trollers.
A signal v is needed, when v is input of a controller.
Case Study (Fig. 2): The rover is tele-operated by the controller znotebook
publishing the desired velocity vcmd. The distance to the nearest obstacle vdmin
is evaluated by the component zdmin calc using the LIDAR data as input. As
soon as vdmin falls below a safety margin (for simplicity a constant value) the
robot’s verified desired velocity vsafe cmd is set to 0. The component zrover uc
applies vsafe cmd to the motors and provides sonar range measurements vsonar
and actual linear and angular velocity vspeed.
Another component ztof provides 3D images of the environment in front of
the rover. However, dashed signals in Fig. 2 are not used for collision avoidance
but available for other tasks (e.g., parking, object recognition).
3.3 Input Interface of Components
The messages communicated within the network may be received synchronously
or asynchronously. In our rover like in many other IoT infrastructures, the com-
munication is asynchronous, i.e., the exact point in time of a message reception
is unknown. The task of the component might be executed when an itom is
received (e.g., zdmin calc calculating minimum distance when receiving vlidar).
However, the inputs of a software component might be published with different
rates. Some components therefore have to cope with multi-rate, asynchronous
and late messages. The monitor described in Sec. 5 periodically executes the
plausibility check using the itoms collected since the last monitor call and a
(configurable sized) buffer of itoms of previous executions.
3.4 Knowledge Base of Redundancy
This section defines the knowledge base used to describe implicit redundancy [13].
3.4.1 Variables and Relations
Variables are related to each other. A relation r : vo = f(VI) is a function or
program (e.g., math, pseudo code or executable python code) to compute an
output variable vo from a set of input variables VI . The relations can be de-
fined by the application’s domain expert or learned (approximated) with neural
networks, SVMs or polynomial functions (see [14]).
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3.4.2 Structure
The knowledge base K = (V,R, E) is a bipartite directed graph (which may
also contain cycles) with independent sets of variables V and of relations R of
a CPS. V and R are the nodes of the graph. Edges E specify the input/output
interface of a relation. In particular, vi is an input variable for r iff ∃(vi, r) ∈ E
denoted as vi
e−→ r. vo is the output variable of r iff ∃(r, vo) ∈ E denoted as
r
e−→ vo. PredY (x) denotes the predecessors of a node x in graph Y . There are
no bidirectional edges, i.e., if vi
e−→ r ⇒ 6 ∃r e−→ vi. Hence a variable is either
input or output to a relation, but never both. A relation can further have only
one output variable, i.e., for ∀j 6= i if r e−→ vi ⇒ 6 ∃r e−→ vj . Note that relations
have to be modeled as nodes, not edges, because a variable is typically related
to more than one variable via a single relation.
Case Study: The application nodes of the rover (Fig. 2) provide several
observation signals. The relations of the signals, that is the knowledge base, are
set up manually (Fig. 3).
vdmin
vdmin
∫vdmin′
vspeed
vspeed
vsafe cmd
d
dt
min(.) v2D = {d(x1,y1), ..} vlidarvsonar
{d(x,y,z)|z = zlidar} v3D = {d(x1,y1,z1), ..} vtof
Figure 3: Knowledge base of the mobile robot depicting relations exploitable
for collision avoidance. Boxes are relations. Ellipses are variables. Variables are
annotated with available signals (from Figure 2).
3.4.3 Substitution
A substitution s of vsink is a connected acyclic sub-graph of the knowledge
base with the following properties: i) The output variable is the only sink of
the substitution (acyclic + Eq. 2). ii) Each variable has zero or one relation
as predecessor (Eq. 3). iii) All input variables of a relation must be included
(Eq. 4; it follows that the sources of the substitution graph are variables only).
s = (Vs,Rs, Es) (1)
vsink ∈ Vs,Vs ⊆ V,Rs ⊆ R, Es ⊆ E
∀x ∈ Rs ∪ Vs \ vsink ∃y ∈ Rs ∪ Vs | ∃x e∈Es−−−→ y (2)
∀v ∈ Vs |Preds(v)| ≤ 1 (3)
∀r ∈ Rs ∀v ∈ PredK(r) | v ∈ Vs (4)
A substitution s is valid if all sources are provided, otherwise the substitution
is invalid. We denote the set of valid substitutions of a variable v as S(v). Only
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a valid substitution can be instantiated by concatenating the relations Rs to the
function fs which takes selected signals Is as input.
Case Study: When vdmin fails it can be replaced by the outputs of the
substitution in Figure 4, by using the provided signal vtof as input.
vdminmin(.)v2D = {d(x1,y1), ..}
{d(x,y,z)|z = zlidar}vtof
Figure 4: A valid substitution for vdmin.
4 SHSA in Prolog
A Prolog program is a set of facts, rules and queries. The formal definitions of
SHSA given above can be efficiently (that is, with a few lines of code) expressed
in Prolog. It is also a good basis to extend SHSA in future work, e.g., runtime
adaptation of the knowledge base or validation of requirements for substitutions.
The structure of the knowledge base and availability of variables is defined
by a set of Prolog facts (see example in Listing 1). In particular, a relation
r : vo = f(VI) is written as the fact function(o,r,[i0,..,in]) with a list of
names [i0,..,in] representing the input variables, a name of the relation r and
the name of the output variable o. An itom i is available when the fact itom(i)
evaluates to true. In addition, each itom has to be mapped to its corresponding
variable. For convenience, the availability of a variable can be specified via
a list of itoms, e.g., itomOf(v,[i0,..,in]). This implicitly maps each itom
i* to the variable v and marks the variable v as provided(v) (provided is
a Prolog property). The facts itomsOf(.) are added during runtime to the
program (structure of the knowledge base) depending on the itoms gathered by
the monitor.
Case Study: Listing 1 shows the knowledge base of Figure 3 in Prolog.
Table 2 maps the knowledge base variables to Prolog names.
1 :- use_module(library(shsa )).
2
3 % structure
4 function(dmin , r1 , [d_2d ]).
5 function(d_2d , r2 , [d_3d ]).
6 function(dmin , r3 , [dmin_last , speed ]).
7 function(dmin_last , r4 , [dmin ]).
8
9 % provided itoms
10 itomsOf(dmin , ["/emergency_stop/dmin/data"]).
11 itomsOf(d_2d , ["/p2os/sonar/ranges",
12 "/scan/ranges"]).
13 itomsOf(d_3d , ["/tof_camera/frame/depth"]).
14 itomsOf(speed , ["/p2os/cmd_vel",
8
15 "/p2os/odom"]).
Listing 1: Knowledge base of the mobile robot in Prolog.
Variable Prolog Signal Prolog
vdmin dmin vdmin "/calculator/dmin"
vdmin′ dmin_last - -
vspeed speed vspeed "/rover/act_vel"
vsafe cmd "/safe/cmd_vel"
v2D d_2d vsonar "/sonar/ranges"
vlidar "/lidar/ranges"
v3D d_3d vtof "/tof/ranges"
Table 2: Used variable and signal names in Prolog.
The Prolog library shsa implements a set of rules to evaluate properties (e.g.,
SHSA properties of variables like provided(v).) or to search substitutions for
a needed variable (query substitution(v,S).). It basically implements the
definitions in the previous section within 22 lines of code. Details can be found
in our repository 1.
Finally, we can query properties, e.g., substitution(v,S). to find all valid
substitutions for the variable v. The Prolog engine (here: ProbLog [28]) tries
to satisfy the query, that is, it searches for S which evaluates the query to true
(“unify” S) considering the given facts (SHSA knowledge base) and rules (SHSA
library). In this case, S is a relation or a tree of relations, see the substitute
search for dmin in Listing 2.
1 substitution(dmin ,"/emergency_stop/dmin/data")
2 substitution(dmin ,[ function(dmin ,r1 ,[d_2d]),
3 "/scan/ranges"])
4 substitution(dmin ,[ function(dmin ,r1 ,[d_2d]),
5 "/p2os/sonar/ranges"])
6 substitution(dmin ,[ function(dmin ,r1 ,[d_2d]),
7 [function(d_2d ,r2 ,[d_3d]),
8 "/tof_camera/frame/depth"]])
Listing 2: Evaluation result of the query substitution(dmin,S).
The complexity of the query is the one of a depth-first search, i.e., O(bd) with
the branching factor b and depth d.
ProbLog provides a Python interface which makes it easy to interface with
our existing application. Moreover, Python facilitates data (pre-)processing
and enables the execution of arbitrarily complex code. We therefore parse the
substitution results and execute these in Python.
To this end, each relation is linked to an implementation capturing a string
that can be evaluated in Python (Listing 3).
1https://github.com/dratasich/shsa-prolog
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1 implementation(r1 , "
2 dmin.v = min(d_2d.v)
3 dmin.t = d_2d.t
4 ").
5 implementation(r2 , "
6 # row width of depth image
7 w = 320
8 # take 115th row (about the height of lidar scan)
9 h = 115
10 d_2d.v = [d for i, d in enumerate(d_3d.v)
11 if i >= h*w and i < (h+1)*w]
12 d_2d.t = d_3d.t
13 ").
Listing 3: Python implementation of relations.
For instance, r1 passes the distance measurements d 2d.v through the func-
tion it should implement, here: min. The timestamp dmin.t is adopted from
the distance measurements to indicate the time when the minimum distance
occurred.
5 Fault Detection by Exploiting Redundancy
A generic monitor uses the knowledge base to setup a monitor for a given signal
and to periodically compare against the related signals.
5.1 Setup and Adaptation
First, the monitor queries the valid substitutions S(v) given the variable v to
monitor and the available signals (Sec. 4). Then the monitor parses the result
and instantiates the substitutions. Once set up, the monitor periodically exe-
cutes the substitutions with the given input itoms and compares the outputs
against each other.
On system changes, e.g., regarding the relations or the availability of sig-
nals, the knowledge base can be adapted and the monitor re-initialized. For
instance, the knowledge base may be extended with new relations whenever
new information becomes available (i.e., when new observation components are
connected).
Case Study: The collision avoidance (controller zsafe) needs the signal
vdmin which shall therefore be monitored. The setup is depicted in Figure 5.
This monitor compares the output of 5 substitutions (including the empty sub-
stitution using the itoms of signal vdmin directly).
Note, that the substitutions should be diverse. For instance, an error in
the LIDAR will cause errors in 3 substitutions including vdmin itself (zcalc uses
vlidar as input too).
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vsonar vlidar vtof vdmin
{d(x,y,z)|z = zlidar}
min(.) min(.) min(.)
compare
vdmin
status
s0 s1 s2 s3
Figure 5: Check vdmin against redundancy. The itoms are first transferred into
the common domain (here: vdmin) and compared against each other.
5.2 Observation Model
Once the observations or itoms are in the common domain, their values can be
compared to each other. However, the values are uncertain, e.g., due to noise,
interference or environmental conditions (the accuracy of a LIDARs distance
measurement for instance is sensitive to the reflexion capabilities of a surface).
In our proof-of-concept implementation we use simple integer arithmetic to
express the allowed uncertainty of an itom or confidence into an itom. The value
of the itom v(ts) = (v, ts) is expressed as an interval (Eq. 5).
v = [v, v] = {v ∈ R2 | v ≤ x ≤ v} (5)
In real-world data, however, the itoms diverge not only in space but also
in the time domain. This phenomenon is known as dead-time or aftereffect
and occurs in time-delay systems [29]. Delays may accumulate from different
sources, not only from communication latency. For instance, the travel of sound
is slower than the travel of light. So the sonar sensor of a mobile robot will
react slower to changes in the distance than a laser scanner. The time shifts can
be estimated, e.g., by using the Skorokhod distance [30]. However, the delay of
the sonar measurement depends on the distance measured, i.e., the time delay
is not constant.
We therefore distinguish between the time tx, when the CPS variable actually
adopted the value, the timestamp of the measurement ts included in the itom
(typically the time when the message has been generated and provided by the
sensor) and the time the itom is received tr or used tcur (here: by the monitor),
depicted in Figure 6. Unfortunately, tx is unknown and typically does not match
ts (though often the difference is neglectable). CPS variables are often sampled
periodically. The sampling period T , i.e., the time between two consecutive
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itoms of a signal, should be small enough to follow the dynamics of the CPS
variable under observation.
ttx ts tr tcur
Figure 6: Timeline of an itom v(ts).
Note that the timeline or the order of these timestamps are applicable in
most CPSs, regardless of the type or implementation of the communication
(e.g., synchronous or asynchronous). However, the results of the computation
using the itom might get distorted, especially when ts  tx (late time-stamping,
e.g., due to insufficient sensor capabilities) or T < (tr−ts) (high communication
latency, e.g., due to monitoring in the cloud).
For the above reasons, the monitor should not simply compare the last values
received but consider the time delay (from tx to tcur). Still the itom is the best
(latest) the monitor can make use of (without much more effort like forward
estimation). An itom is therefore considered valid for a time interval or time
span (and not only at the given timestamp ts of the itom).
v(ts) = (v, t) v = [v, v] (6)
t = [t, t] ts ∈ [t, t]
An itom is typically late (e.g., acquired by a sensor), but it may be valid/use-
ful into the future, i.e., the sampling time ts lies within the time span t.
A variable v is provided at time tcur when at least one corresponding itom
v(t) exists with tcur ∈ t.
Case Study: We set t = [ts−∆, ts] given the timestamp of the observation
ts and a delay ∆ which sums up the latencies caused by the sampling process,
pre-processing (e.g., filtering) and communication. The size of the interval may
match the sampling period T of the signal to continuously have comparable
values. Note, that a sensor should be able to follow the dynamics of the system
(T is small enough). Figure 7 visualizes two signals of the same variable and
the confidence intervals of the latest itoms received by the monitor. For a one-
dimensional itom the confidence region is a rectangle.
The demonstration in Section 6 uses the specifications from sensors’ datasheets.
For instance, we set the maximum delay ∆sonar of the itoms provided by the
array of 8 sonar sensors to 8 · 10ms, considering the maximum range of 3m, the
sonar speed of 343m/s and an average communication delay of 1ms.
5.3 Comparison
Exceeding the threshold for an error is implicitly defined by the size of the
intervals (in time and space). Overlapping confidence intervals indicate the
itoms to be equal (Fig. 7), non-overlapping means the itoms diverge. It is
a relative fast way to compare itoms (cf. itoms represented by a probability
distribution), and therefore suitable for real-time systems.
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tv(t)
ts
∆ = T
tcur
Figure 7: Two one-dimensional signals (itoms over time). The confidence regions
of the latest itoms are highlighted.
The monitor is periodically (Tm) fed with the latest itoms. It may save pre-
vious itoms to compensate for late receptions, so a newly received, but delayed
itom (t tr < tcur) can be compared to a past itom with similar time interval.
The total set of buffered itoms I is used as inputs to the substitutions S(v)
to generate comparable (output) itoms. Two or more itoms are comparable
when the itoms have a common corresponding variable and their time intervals
overlap.
A monitor step consists of the following substeps:
• Collect combinations of input itoms (v, t) per substitution s ∈ S(v) such
that their time intervals overlap and a combination c contains exactly one
itom per input signal v ∈ Is of s (Cartesian product).
∀s ∈ S(v), v1, .., vm ∈ Is :
Cs = {((v, t)1, . . . , (v, t)m) | ∩i=1,..,m ti 6= ∅}
• Execute the substitutions to generate output itoms to compare against.
The value interval of the input itoms c ∈ Cs of a substitution s are passed
through the functions of s giving the value interval of the output itom
(see interval arithmetic [31]). The time interval of the output itom is the
intersection of the time intervals of the inputs.
∀s ∈ S(v), ∀c ∈ Cs :
O = {(s, (v, t)) |v = fs(c), t =
⋂
vi∈c
ti}
• Pairwise compare the output itoms O to calculate an error matrix of the
value intervals.
∀(s, (v, t))i, (s, (v, t))j ∈ O, i 6= j :
esisj =
∑
|max(vi, vj)−min(vi, vj)|
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• Rank the error to return the substitution with the highest error. The
errors per substitution are summed up (sum of columns or rows of the error
matrix). When an error per substitution is greater than 0 the monitor
returns the failed substitution.
Case Study: The implementation uses pyinterval 2 to pass itoms through
a substitution or to identify the pairs of itoms to compare. The size of the
itoms buffer is a constant parameter of the monitor for simplicity. However,
the monitor may increase the size of the buffer according to the observed delays
(tr − ts).
6 Experiments
In this section we demonstrate the monitor setup and fault detection.
6.1 Setup
The demo uses the mobile robot described in Sec. 3. The hosts on the rover
(connected via WiFi to the notebook) only run the sensor drivers, while the
controllers and the monitor are executed on the notebook (Intel i7 2.1GHz x 4,
8GB RAM, Ubuntu, ROS and its nodes run in Docker containers).
The rover is tele-operated via the notebook towards a wall (Fig. 8). The
ROS messages of the sensors (monitored inputs) and the monitor itself (failed
substitution and additional debug output) are logged.
Figure 8: Images of the test scenario. The figure on the right depicts a ToF
camera depth image. The line marked in red is used to compare against the
laser scan.
6.2 Demonstration
Figure 9 depicts some application logs taken from a run of the demo. The
rover first moves slowly and straight towards the wall (t = 2..5s: vdmin slowly
2https://pypi.org/project/pyinterval/
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Figure 9: Visualization of an application run in the scenario. Plots (from top to
bottom): (1) speed commands (linear and angular velocity) from the notebook,
(2) minimum distance to an obstacle vdmin (based on LIDAR data) - the red
area indicates the collision avoidance threshold.
decreases). To test the possibly different delays of the sensors, a dynamic ob-
stacle has been placed in front of the rover for some period of time (t = 5..8s:
vdmin falls below a threshold, robot stops). Finally, the rover reaches the wall
(t = 17..20s) and goes back relatively fast (t = 20..23s).
The distance measurements in Figure 10) show the significant differences,
e.g., in field of view (the smallest is the one of the ToF camera) or resolution
(8 measurements from the sonar vs. 320 from the ToF camera vs. 512 from
the LIDAR), of the 3 sensors: sonar array, LIDAR and ToF camera. However,
in the domain of vdmin the observations can be reasonably compared though
outliers have to be reckoned.
Figure 11 runs the monitor on the itoms collected above. The monitor
triggers some faults due to improper timestamps of the sonar array (late when
obstacle appears, but too early when the obstacle disappears) and an outlier of
the same.
6.3 Fault Detection
To visualize and test the fault detection we inject faults to a generated set of
itoms The itoms per monitor step have equal value and slightly shifted times-
tamps.
Table 3 summarizes the types of faults, how these are injected and the ex-
pected output of the monitor. Note that transient faults (outliers) can be mit-
igated by the additionally provided moving-median or moving-average filter of
the monitor output. We therefore focus on faults occurring over a longer period
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Figure 10: Signals in the domain vd 2d at about 7s. Observations of the sensors
measuring distance to obstacles (sonar, LIDAR, ToF camera).
Fault Injection
Random noise Add noise sample x ∼ U(a, b) to the observation.
Stuck-at 0 Set observation to 0.
Time shift Add the duration ∆ to the reception timestamp tr of the
observation.
Missing or
lost messages
Delay observations by ∆ > nbuf · Tm (implemented by
time shift).
Table 3: Fault injection to an input signal of a substitution.
of time (or permanent faults) and turn the filters off for reasonable plots of
the results. All faults are injected for a specific period of time [tstart, tend]. k
faults can be identified when the number of comparable outputs is ≥ 2k+1 (for
Byzantine faults: 3k+1). To be able to identify a fault in our setup, we assume
only one simultaneous fault in the value domain. The buffer size nbuf of the
monitor is set to 1 for testing faults in the value domain.
Figures 12 and 13 visualizes fault detection of 3 substitution outputs. The
top plot annotates the time span with a description of the injected fault. The
height of the bar references the substitution index to which the fault has been
injected. The generated value is represented by a marker while the uncertainty
(intervals) is plotted as two error bars along the x- (time) and y-axis (value).
The upper plot presents the timeline of reception of the monitor inputs (tr of
the itoms). The lower plot shows the outputs of the substitution executed by
the monitor, i.e., the itoms at the time of occurrence (ts or t of the itoms). The
bottom indicates the substitution index with the highest error.
For instance, in Fig. 12 stuck-at 0 and random noise has been applied to the
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Figure 11: Monitor outputs over time of the demonstration. Plots (from top
to bottom): (1) vdmin, outputs of the substitutions (executed by the monitor),
(2) error per substitution (calculated by the monitor), (3) output status of the
monitor – index of the failed substitution or -1 if all comparable substitution
outputs match.
input of substitution s1 and s0, respectively. The monitor gathers the itoms
since the last call (here within the last second) and compares the outputs of the
substitutions when the time intervals overlap. Because the value intervals of s1
during the time marked with “stuck-at 0” do not overlap the value intervals of
the other substitutions s1 has an error 6= 0 and the monitor indicates the failed
substitution as s1.
In Fig. 13 the capability to compensate delays is tested. The input of s1 is
missing in the monitor call at time 3s. The faulty substitution is miss-classified
because of only two available outputs to compare (no majority vote possible).
However, with a buffer size of nbuf = 2 the fault can be detected (the monitor
collects itoms within nbuf · Tm, here, the last 2 monitor periods). The delayed
itom of s1 can be compared to the itoms of the last call. It matches the output
of s0, so the monitor classifys s2 as faulty at time 4s.
The logged data and the scripts to inject faults and run the monitor offline
can be found on GitHub 3.
3https://github.com/tuw-cpsg/paper-shsa-monitor-experiments
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Figure 12: Fault detection in the value domain. From top to bottom: (1) recep-
tion of inputs (points) and monitor calls (dashed vertical lines), (2) outputs of
the substitutions including uncertainty, (3) fault injection, (4) monitor output
(index of the failed substitution or -1 if all substitution outputs match).
7 Conclusion
A cyber-physical system (CPS) assembled out of many sub-systems provides
observations of different CPS variables which can be interrelated to each other
in a knowledge base. We present a monitor querying the knowledge base to
find redundancies and which can detect faults of observation components by
comparison. The knowledge base has been encoded in Prolog implemented with
the ProbLog library which enables the user to change the knowledge base during
runtime, and add or remove information about the availability of observations.
The monitor can therefore master technological or functional changes in the
CPS. Moreover, we presented an observation model considering uncertainties in
space and time (e.g., noise or delays) of observations collected by the monitor.
In ongoing and future work we want to investigate other methods to compare
and rank the redundant observations over time. Furthermore, we look into how
the redundancy shall be selected (diversity) or proper fault diagnosis can be
applied.
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Figure 13: Fault detection in the time domain. From top to bottom: (1) fault
injection, (2) reception of inputs (points) and monitor calls (dashed vertical
lines), (3) outputs of the substitutions of the monitor nbuf=2, (4) monitor
output (index of the failed substitution or -1 if all substitution outputs match).
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